



THE UNIVERSITY OF ARIZONA
COLLEGE OF SOCIAL & BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES

Center for
Middle Eastern Studies

WHAT IS GOING ON HERE?

**An Inquiry Lesson in Current Events
in the Muslim World**

Using the C3 Framework

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International Studies

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What is going on here?

We will embark upon an investigation of a pressing series of current events in the world. These events have been shaped by thousands of years of history, cultural and political identities, religions, international relations, economics, and other forces.

We will watch some media reports, read some media articles and then begin a more scholarly investigation into the topic. We will continue to go back and touch upon the many things we will discover through this inquiry throughout the year.

Understanding what you read may require some familiarity with vocabulary and geography. Take a minute and look at this list. Put a small check beside the terms that you recognize. Then as we watch the videos, see if you can figure out more. Note things like the date of the video and if you detect a particular perspective on the part of the broadcaster or narrator and on the parts of people or groups in the videos.

Vocabulary:

Religious groups	Places	People	Political parties and terms
Sunni Shiite, Shia Alawite , Alawis Copts, Coptic	Istanbul Gesi Park Taksim Square Izmir Ankara Cairo Tahrir Square Alexandria Sinai Peninsula Damascus Jerusalem Israel Lebanon	Recip Tayyip Erdoğan Bashar al-Assad Muhammed Morsi Hosni Mubarak	Ba’ath Party Republican People’s Party (CHP) Justice and Development Party (AKP) Freedom and Justice Party (FJP) Muslim Brotherhood Coup d’état

STUDENT HANDOUT 1

PART ONE: Watch the following short news clips and take notes. Be sure to note dates of broadcast, country, major people, places, and any obvious bias or points of view, etc.

***Video One:** (Gezi and Taksim) <http://www.cnn.com/video/?/video/international/2013/06/23/pkg-watson-turkey-violent.cnn&ieref=videosearch>

Video Two: Turkey's protests show debate over country's identity

<http://video.foxnews.com/v/2431060920001/turkeys-protests-show-debate-over-countrys-identity--/>

Video Three: Writer: Turkey dangerously polarized <http://www.cnn.com/video/?/video/world/2013/07/20/turkey-divided.cnn&ieref=videosearch>

***Video Four:** Crisis in Egypt <http://video.msnbc.msn.com/newsnation/52775242>

Video Five: How should WH respond to violence raging in Egypt?

<http://video.foxnews.com/v/2606823405001/how-should-wh-respond-to-violence-raging-in-egypt/>

***Video Six:** Arming the Rebels? <http://video.foxnews.com/v/2520427086001/is-arming-syrian-rebels-the-right-answer/>

Video Seven: Refugee Children <http://video.msnbc.msn.com/newsnation/52775242#52854045>

Video Eight: Syria warns US. <http://www.cnn.com/2013/08/27/world/meast/syria-civil-war/>

***Video Nine:** Editorial – What is behind the discontent?

<http://globalpublicsquare.blogs.cnn.com/2013/08/24/why-discontent-may-be-good-thing-in-long-run/?iref=allsearch>

STUDENT HANDOUT 1

Quick write: ***What is going on here?***

Write for five minutes using your notes from the video clips. What do you think is happening? Are there differencing perspectives evident in the broadcasts? What else do you need to know in order to understand what is going on?

Time is up. Turn to your elbow partner and share what you have written. Add anything you have learned from your elbow partner.

Share out hypotheses. What else do you need to know? What questions do you have?
(As we write them on the board, jot your classmates' ideas, questions and hypotheses here – we will revisit them later)

STUDENT HANDOUT 2

PART TWO: Where is all this happening? Mapping the discontent



BODIES OF WATER	COUNTRIES	Iran	Damascus
Mediterranean Sea	Egypt	Oman	Baghdad
Red Sea	Turkey	Saudi Arabia	Tehran
Persian Gulf	Syria	Kuwait	Amman
Arabian Sea	Yemen	Cyprus	Jerusalem
Black Sea	Lebanon	CITIES	OTHER FEATURES
Aral Sea	Jordan	Cairo	Sinai Peninsula
Caspian Sea	Israel	Alexandria	Aegean Sea
Gulf of Aden	Iraq	Istanbul	
Gulfs of Aqaba & Suez	Qatar	Ankara	

STUDENT HANDOUT 3

PART THREE: Deep reading together

We will be reading a selection of newspaper articles and editorials that will build your background knowledge of these events as well as present conflicting claims. Your job will be to read and analyze these articles. We will do TWO together to learn how to do it.

Will Turkey Weather the Middle East Storm?

<http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/turkey-s-internal-tensions-and-external-challenges-by-kemal-dervi#cDedQiL6WStt2Mwx.99>

Divided republic: A rebellion for Turkey's soul

<http://rt.com/op-edge/turkey-protest-gezi-democracy-887/>

As we read, we will be ensuring that we can address the following reading skills:

Key Ideas and Details

- Cite specific textual evidence to support analysis of primary and secondary sources, connecting insights gained from specific details to an understanding of the text as a whole.
- Determine the central ideas or information of a primary or secondary source; provide an accurate summary that makes clear the relationships among the key details and ideas.
- Evaluate various explanations for actions or events and determine which explanation best accords with textual evidence, acknowledging where the text leaves matters uncertain.

Craft and Structure

- Determine the meaning of words and phrases as they are used in a text, including analyzing how an author uses and refines the meaning of a key term over the course of a text.
- Analyze in detail how a complex primary source is structured, including how key sentences, paragraphs, and larger portions of the text contribute to the whole.
- Evaluate authors' differing points of view on the same historical event or issue by assessing the authors' claims, reasoning, and evidence.

Integration of Knowledge and Ideas

- Integrate and evaluate multiple sources of information presented in diverse formats and media (e.g., visually, quantitatively, as well as in words) in order to address a question or solve a problem.
- Evaluate an author's premises, claims, and evidence by corroborating or challenging them with other information.
- Integrate information from diverse sources, both primary and secondary, into a coherent understanding of an idea or event, noting discrepancies among sources.

STUDENT HANDOUT 3

In your packet, select TWO additional articles from the newspaper section. Follow the same instructions we used for the first two that we did together and make note on the same nine points above.

READING TIPS:

- *Read and think BEFORE you highlight or underline.*
- *Look away from the text and ask yourself, "What is this about? What is the author trying to tell us?"*
- *Then go back and highlight the parts of the text that answers these questions.*
- *What phrases or words does the author use to lead you to think a certain way.*
- *How does the author structure the text or argument to build to what s/he wants us to think?*
- *How does what you are reading corroborate or conflict with other articles and the videos?*

For homework, read TWO more articles from your packet. Take notes, write down questions you have and identify claims made in the articles. (You will have read 6 articles in all)

ARTICLES AND EDITORIALS IN PACKET:

Analysts: Turkey losing regional clout as Egypt crisis flares Al Aribiya

<http://english.alarabiya.net/en/perspective/analysis/2013/08/16/Analysis-Turkey-losing-regional-clout-as-Egypt-crisis-flares.html>

Will Turkey Weather the Middle East Storm?

<http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/turkey-s-internal-tensions-and-external-challenges-by-kemal-dervi#cDedQiL6WStt2Mwx.99>

Pro-Democracy Forces Still Among Rebels Fighting Assad, Study Finds

by [Christopher Dickey](#) Sep 9, 2013 4:45 AM EDT

<http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2013/09/09/pro-democracy-forces-still-among-rebels-fighting-assad-study-finds.html>

Divided republic: A rebellion for Turkey's soul

<http://rt.com/op-edge/turkey-protest-gezi-democracy-887/>

New York Times May 21, 2012 No Model for Muslim Democracy

http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/22/opinion/no-model-for-muslim-democracy.html?_r=0

Muslim Brotherhood Spokesman Arrested in Cairo; Here's What He Told Margaret Warner 9 Days Ago

<http://www.pbs.org/newshour/rundown/2013/09/newshour-interviewed-brotherhood-spokesman-gehad-al-haddad-days-before-arrest.html>

Democracy in Egypt Can Wait

http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/17/opinion/democracy-in-egypt-can-wait.html?_r=0

The Egyptian Debacle

<http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/20/opinion/global/the-egyptian-debacle.html>

"Why Turkey and Iran Oppose the Military Coup in Egypt"

http://www.huffingtonpost.com/alparslan-akku/why-turkey-and-iran-ppos_b_3686413.html

Will Turkey Weather the Middle East Storm?

Read more at <http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/turkey-s-internal-tensions-and-external-challenges-by-kemal-dervi#cDedQiL6WStt2Mwx.99>

Kemal Derviş

Kemal Derviş, former Minister of Economic Affairs of Turkey and former Administrator for the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), is Vice President of the Brookings Institution.

ISTANBUL – A cycle of terrible violence has taken over much of the Middle East. Its center has shifted from Iraq (where sectarian strife has recently escalated again) to Syria, but it encompasses Egypt, Yemen, Libya, and Tunisia as well. Farther east, Afghanistan is suffering its second decade of violent conflict, while Pakistan seems to be chronically on the brink of war, civil war, or social breakdown.

The most worrisome underlying threat is the increase in fighting between Sunni and Shia Muslims. Likewise, pious conservatives and liberal and leftist secular youth, who joined forces in Cairo and Tunis in 2010-2011 to challenge the dictators, have now turned on each other: witness the Egyptian security forces' appalling massacres of Islamist demonstrators in Cairo recently, following a military coup carried out with liberals' support. The region's people are sliding into enemy camps, deepening their societies' wounds in the process.

I have often argued that Turkey should not intervene in the internal affairs of its neighbors or adopt a Middle East-centered policy. Both government and opposition should remain steadfastly focused on Europe, despite the obstacles that the European Union has placed in Turkey's way during membership negotiations.

But Turkey cannot be indifferent to the tragedy engulfing its southern neighbors. The Arab world's pain is acutely felt, owing to Turkey's historical, religious, and emotional bonds with these countries. Moreover, economic ties and sheer proximity mean that Turkey's prosperity depends, to some degree at least, on that of the Middle East.

In recent years, there was hope that Turkey could help by serving as a model of a successful economy and well-functioning democracy; but recent events have raised doubts. In fact, Turkey must overcome four sources of internal tension if it is to continue to thrive economically, consolidate its democracy, and act as a compelling example to others.

The first and most serious source of tension stems from the need to recognize Kurdish identity as a fully legitimate part of the Turkish Republic. Those who wish to express a Kurdish identity, as well as all other citizens, must be confident that, while all remain committed to national unity, Turkey is a country in which diversity can thrive.

Second, there is an underlying historical tension between the large Sunni majority and the Alevi-Bektashi minority, loosely linked to Shia Islam.

Third, there is the difference between those who adhere to the tradition of political Islam and those who uphold the strict secularism that came with the republic. Often this social "divide" intersects with the Sunni-Alevi cleavage, as the Alevis have increasingly aligned themselves with the political left.

Finally, there is a growing perception of partisanship within the public administration. Building independent, non-partisan regulatory bodies was one of the key pillars of the 2001-2002 reform program. But these reforms have been rolled back recently, with independent regulatory authorities again coming under the control of government ministries (though it seems that the central bank has retained much of its autonomy). As the perception of non-

STUDENT HANDOUT 3

partisanship in public administration has diminished, proximity to those in power has become another source of tension.

Turkey benefits from republican reflexes and values that have been built over decades, as well as from humanist wisdom anchored in centuries of history. Yet, given the regional context, Turkey's internal tensions now represent a serious threat.

All sides must manage these tensions with great care and caution. Respect for diversity and individual freedom, and concern for generating growth and jobs in an atmosphere of social peace, must be guiding principles. Healing the wounds to which all sides have at times contributed, and practicing forgiveness, should be the order of the day. A spiral of frustration and antagonism must not be allowed to develop.

Turkey must look carefully at the catastrophe unfolding around it in the Middle East. Humanitarian help is necessary, and Turkey is providing it generously, in ways that should serve as an example for Western countries. But Turkey's political leaders, opinion shapers, and citizens must also recognize that the only protection against a similar disaster at home is a vibrant democracy, a fully professional public administration, and a tolerant society embodying pride and affection for the country's diversity.

Others will not protect Turkey; some may even promote strife within its borders (historical examples of such tactics abound). Turkey alone can protect itself, and only by upholding truly democratic behavior at home and pursuing an external policy that promotes peace and democracy but does not take sides in the region's ongoing battles, particularly between Sunni and Shia.

Fortunately, there is hope. The Gezi Park demonstrators who in June protested peacefully against the use of excessive police force by simply standing still also protested peacefully, years ago, against the ban on the headscarf then in effect in Turkey's universities. This kind of concern for the rights of all is a hallmark of Turkey's young generation.

Similarly, when the outgoing governor of Van sent a farewell message last month to the largely Kurdish-speaking people in his southeastern province, he delivered it in Kurdish – and received warm wishes in return.

A large majority of Turkey's citizens share such generosity of spirit. That is why, despite serious difficulties, Turkey has a good chance of overcoming its internal tensions and becoming the example that its Middle East neighbors (and perhaps a few of its European neighbors as well) so desperately need.

Read more at <http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/turkey-s-internal-tensions-and-external-challenges-by-kemal-dervi#cDedQiL6WStt2Mwx.99>

Divided republic: A rebellion for Turkey's soul

<http://rt.com/op-edge/turkey-protest-gezi-democracy-887/>

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September 15, 2013

The battle between protesters and the Turkish government over the proposed demolition of Gezi Park may have subsided, but the war for Turkey's soul, its form of democracy and its foreign policy is raging across the country's urban centers.

Cycles of renewed demonstrations and spirited duels involving angry youth and tense police forces continue to keep the country's major cities on the boil, and to sow doubts about the future direction of what was once hailed as a "global swing state" that would have a decisive impact on Middle Eastern and world politics.

A heavily polarized domestic political scene does not augur well for Turkey to formulate consensus on key policy questions.

Compounding the troubles is a plunge in the Turkish lira, mounting current account deficits and foreign debt, and a flight of capital. The much-touted Turkish "economic miracle" is under a cloud, threatening to deepen the social fissures which are already wide open.

Culture war for Turkish identity

What do the protesters want? I spoke to dozens of college students who are the kernel of the uprising against what they denounce as the "dictatorship" of the popularly-elected Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan. I sensed that their demands hark back to the dual identity of Turkey as both a European and an Islamic nation. Some of them listed grievances such as restrictions on personal freedoms; the non-availability of alcohol after 10 pm; the ban on public displays of affection; the lifting of the constitutional ban on the hijab (the traditional Islamic headscarf for women); and the "advice" from Erdogan for Turkish women to have "at least three children." My enraged interlocutors, who fall mostly in the late teens and early twenties demographic, insist that they have "no freedom in this country."

A common refrain in the sloganeering that lights up the nights with political sparks and an air of confrontation between the youth and police in all Turkish cities is: "We are the soldiers of Mustafa." Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, the founding father of the modern Turkish Republic, was a staunch secularist imbued in Western values who instituted the constitutional principle of secularism, and prevented the Turkish state from adopting Islam as the state religion. Most of the angst of the urbanites taking up cudgels against the current Islamist Turkish government stems from fears of Erdogan's creeping "hidden agenda" to push the country towards a state-approved religious fundamentalist order.

But Erdogan's supporters have a different take on the culture war. Their first counterpoint is that Turkey has an overwhelmingly Muslim population, which has been subject to deracination by Kemalist civilians and military rulers for decades. For those who decry Erdogan's permission to overturn the longstanding ban on displaying the hijab in universities and government offices, the traditionalists retort that over 60 percent of Turkish women anyway adorn headscarves and they should be "free" to do so in campuses and public sector locations. Arguably, Turkey is relatively the freest Muslim majority country in the world in terms of personal liberties, and the defenders of Erdogan and his Islamist AKP party contend that the secularists are setting up a straw man by alleging that these historically inherited freedoms are in danger.

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Many Turks I have interacted with on the streets detest the ongoing cycle of mass protests by their fellow citizens, and some accuse the protesters of carrying the banner of homosexuality. Prime Minister Erdogan has labeled gay people as “*contrary to Islam*” and some of his aides have labeled them as carriers of a “*biological disorder and disease*.” The conjunction between the environmental cause of preserving Gezi Park and the gay rights movement in recent months has drawn ridicule from traditionalist Turks that the park is a “haven for gay couples to consort” and that “*immoral acts*” should not be tolerated.

The back-and-forth between the secularists and the Islamists has a no-quarter-given quality to it, with little possibility of any midway compromise. This goes to the root of the problem besieging Turkey, which has long nursed ambitions of joining the European Union but is also experiencing a revival of Islamic sentiments based on socially conservative ideals.

With elections scheduled in 2014, Prime Minister Erdogan is unable to relax his foot on the Islamism accelerator owing to fear of losing his traditional base within the AKP party, and that half of the electorate which is pious and expects him to uphold the conservative banner. The great success story of Turkey as a resolver of the dilemma between Islam and Western-style liberal democracy is thus being torn apart as the crisis unfolds.

‘Democracy with Turkish characteristics’

I asked organizers of the protests in Istanbul how they could claim to be fighting for democracy when Erdogan’s AKP party had won convincing majorities in three successive elections since 2002. The protest brigade responds with theories that cast doubts on the fairness of the election results as well as the political maturity of voters in rural Turkey, which is the traditionalist stronghold of Erdogan.

With undisguised contempt, many protest leaders say that vote-buying through AKP inducements is rampant in the politically sleepier Anatolian periphery, and that the patronage networks of AKP politicians ensures thumping majorities in elections by capitalizing on the “*ignorance*” of the masses. One Kurdish youth, who is active in mobilizing demonstrations in the Beyoglu district of Istanbul, even came up with an estimate of “*a maximum of 35 percent of Turks who genuinely believe in the Islamist ideology out of conviction*.” The rest of the AKP’s support base, he claimed, were gullible peasants who can be wheedled into voting for it through petty sops.

If sections of the protest movement sound Bohemian and elitist, there is also a leftwing strand among the opposition parties which leads loud group chanting in public squares for Erdogan’s resignation. The social-democratic Republican Peoples Party (CHP), which won 26 percent of the votes in the last election, and the smaller Communist Party of Turkey (TKP), are often vocal in the street tussles with the police, while their banners are prominent there, too. The occasional Che Guevara red flags are in plain sight.

These progressives articulate more of an economic critique of the Turkish government’s path rather than its assault on personal freedoms. The high level of inflation, the awarding of lucrative construction contracts to government crony capitalists, and nearly double-digit unemployment are issues that are intermeshed with the disenchantment that started over Gezi Park but has metastasized into something wider. Here, Turkey is no different from other emerging market economies (EMEs), which underwent breakneck economic growth until recently, but incurred costs like rising inequalities and failing social safety nets.

Each of the different sections of the protest movement in Turkey has its own hobby horses and respective leaderships. The absence of a unifying theme or leader (most unaffiliated student demonstrators dismiss the CHP’s Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu as “*uninspiring*”) and the somewhat different conceptions of democratization mean that Prime Minister Erdogan is still the most prominent, recognizable public figure in the country. The fact that he tamed the

STUDENT HANDOUT 3

historically interventionist Turkish military is acknowledged even by those who attack his “*authoritarian*” tendencies.

Erdogan has become easily the country’s most revered, yet most controversial politician since Ataturk. His determined effort to shift the civilian-military balance of power in favor of the politicians and away from the generals, as well as the growth of the middle class that his early economic reforms engendered, are ironically the propellers of the vast civilian space in which the present anti-government agitation is flourishing.

The “*democracy with Turkish characteristics*” that Erdogan has shepherded created the openings for a fearless generation of youth who want more civil liberties. Here, the perception that the prime minister is a “*victim of his own success*” rings true. Some interpret this as meaning that Erdogan lost his sense of limits on authority and allowed electoral success to get to his head. Either way, there are no sparks of revolt without the prior underlying structural transformation – for which all credit goes to Erdogan.

Sparring over Syria

Although foreign policy debates are limited to the intelligentsia and think tanks in Turkey, the anti-government rallies also contain critics of Erdogan’s unabashed backing of Sunni rebels waging a relentless war to unseat President Bashar Assad in neighboring Syria. Asking anti-Erdogan protesters about Syria, I found that they had little sympathy for the rebels there. Some of them accused the AKP of arming and financing the Free Syrian Army as a “*payment to its American masters.*” The way in which Washington has adjusted its stance in the Middle East since the fall of Hosni Mubarak in Egypt by embracing elected Islamists such as ex-President Mohamed Morsi and Erdogan is understood by more perceptive Turks, however.

I asked the protesters about the refugee inflow into Turkey and the atrocities occurring in the Syrian war, and whether this justifies the AKP’s backing of the anti-Assad rebels. Their response was that Erdogan was selective in denouncing war crimes and crimes against humanity. When the Sunni dictator Saddam Hussein was massacring civilians in Iraq, for instance, Erdogan did not denounce it, even though he is now taking “*a stand for human rights*” against the Alawite Shiite regime of Assad.

Some protest movement members argue that Turkey is “*no longer independent from America.*” During the first few years of Erdogan’s tenure, Turkey had set about distancing itself from Washington and formulated its own autonomous blueprint for regional influence through the so-called “*Davutoglu Doctrine.*” But the war in Syria has brought back Turkey’s older self-image as a NATO member and ally of the West, which sides with America’s regional junior partners such as Saudi Arabia and Qatar.

The protest movement in Turkey includes members of different ethnic minority communities, such as the Kurds (approximately 13 percent of Turkey’s population) and the Alevis (10 percent of the population). Their presence within the opposition has strengthened its rejection of Erdogan’s enthusiastic support for an American military attack on Syria. In their reckoning, the Turkish government is “*playing into the hands of the US, which wants to establish control over the Levant region.*”

Protest leaders in unison prefer a non-military solution to the Syrian war and warn that fanning Sunni fundamentalism in Syria will boomerang on Turkey’s secularists, who are trying to beat back advancing Islamism at home.

Imbalanced 'middle power'

Contradictions abound in Turkish foreign policy. While Ankara may be on the same side as the West on Syria, there is also the *"neo-Ottoman"* inclination to carve out a distinct Turkish sphere in the former Arab colonies of the Middle East. Ankara is the main staging ground for the Western agenda of toppling Assad, but the AKP has also taken a regional lead in opposing Israel's blockade of Gaza. The question may have to be rephrased, from *"On whose behalf is Turkey acting in world affairs?"* to *"What is Turkey's role in the international system?"*

I posed the second question to Mitat Celikpala, a professor of international relations at Istanbul's leading Kadir Has University. He responded that Turkey was *"a middle power that has lost its balance."* As a medium-sized world power, Turkey cannot singlehandedly change either the regional or the global order. But it enjoyed a special attraction and soft power in the Middle East by virtue of its *"European self"* that set it apart from its Arab neighbors. Erdogan, says Celikpala, has diminished Turkey's unique pulling power in the region through his Islamist governance, which negates his country's status as a free space for Arabs experiencing violence and extremism in their home nations.

The era when the Arab world could look up to Turkey with admiration is thus gone. Turkey's geographical location and direct intervention in the Syrian war will keep its reputation as a *"haven"* for refugees, but the sectarian *"Sunni mindset"* which permeates Erdogan's vision of the Middle East has damaged Turkey's quest to assert an economic and cultural variant of neo-Ottomanism.

Endless cat-and-mouse game

My firsthand observation of encounters between police and protesters suggests that the anti-government agitators are growing in skill at urban guerilla tactics. The manner in which they provocatively taunt the police on the main boulevards, like Istanbul's Istiqlal Avenue, then vanish into the stone-paved undulating alleyways and side roads, and regroup in an unexpected corner to strew bricks on road to stymie the armored vehicles of the security forces, reveals remarkable agility.

The resilience of the rebellion is etched in the narrow alleyways of urban Turkey, where one finds ubiquitous spray-painted slogans like *"Police killed Ahmet"* (a reference to Ahmet Atakan, a 22-year-old protester who was recently found dead in the city of Antakya, bordering Syria). The state's harsh response to the agitation has in itself become a rallying cry triggering fresh protests, producing cyclical disturbances that could become the new normal.

Turks who have decided that they will keep protesting until Erdogan goes are becoming inured to the choking tear gas and water cannons aimed at them to sanitize tourist areas. Every demonstrator I met, while huddling for safety behind shop shutters or concrete pillars as the police tried to retake the streets, said she or he was not afraid.

Mass mobilization and self-belief could dwindle as the euphoria of the Taksim Square agitation fades with time, but Turkish politics is at a historic inflection point. The misguided *"children"* and *"terrorists"* whom Erdogan has chastized are hunkering down for a long, nonviolent struggle to reshape the destiny of what used to be a role model in the Middle East. The consensus between Occident and Orient, which underlies Turkey's legend as a crossroad of civilizations, is on the line.

The statements, views and opinions expressed in this column are solely those of the author and do not necessarily represent those of RT.

STUDENT HANDOUT 3

Where do you put the players?

	Secular ←	→ Religious
democratic ↑		
↓ authoritarian		

Does this lead you to any questions?

STUDENT HANDOUT 4

PART FOUR : **COMPELLING QUESTION**

Group work:

In your assigned groups, share your notes and comments on the articles you have read and study the chart you created. What are some of the claims being made in the articles? What is a unifying theme in all of the articles? What are some questions you had about specific articles? Does the chart spark any questions?

*Compelling questions are big questions that arise when scholars study related events or topics to try to figure out “what is going on here?” Work with your group to come up with two or three **compelling questions** that these videos and readings have raised. Remember, these are BIG questions, not detail questions.*

We will share the COMPELLING QUESTIONS from each group and then decide on ONE that addresses all of our interests.

EXIT TICKET: Supporting Questions:

Now that we have decided upon a compelling question, what additional questions does this “Compelling Question” raise?

PART FIVE Research: Now that we have developed our compelling question,

ARE ISLAM AND DEMOCRACY COMPATIBLE?

and some of our supporting questions, we need to begin to **research** to find the answers. As historians, we want to look at the origins of the modern states (Turkey, Egypt and perhaps Syria) in the region and to see how democratic ideas were introduced. We know that some of these ideas came from the West and we know that this area faced hegemonic expansion from Europe during and after WWI, so that would be a good place to start.

We have found TWO primary sources from that period:

Hassan Al-Bana, the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and **Mustafa Kemal Atatürk**, the founder of the modern Turkish Republic.

Primary sources are harder to read than the newspaper articles we have been reading, so we have to learn to READ LIKE HISTORIANS.

STANFORD HISTORY EDUCATION GROUP
READING LIKE A HISTORIAN

Historical Reading Skills	Questions	Students should be able to . . .	Prompts
Sourcing (Before reading document)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> What is the author's point of view? Why was it written? When was it written? Is this source believable? Why? Why not? 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Identify author's position on historical event Identify and evaluate author's purpose in producing document Predict what author will say BEFORE reading document Evaluate source's believability/ trustworthiness by considering genre, audience, and author's purpose. 	<p>This author probably believes . . .</p> <p>I think the audience is . . .</p> <p>Based on the sourcing information, I predict this author will . . .</p> <p>I do/don't trust this document because . . .</p>
Contextualization	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> What else was going on at the time this was written? What was it like to be alive at this time? What things were different back then? What things were the same? 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Use context/background information to draw more meaning from document Infer historical context from document(s) Recognize that document reflects one moment in changing past Understand that words must be understood in a larger context 	<p>I already know that ____ is happening at this time . . .</p> <p>From this document I would guess that people at this time were feeling . . .</p> <p>This document might not give me the whole picture because . . .</p>
Close Reading	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> What claims does the author make? What evidence does the author use to support those claims? How is this document make me feel? What words or phrases does the author use to convince me that he/she is right? What information does the author leave out? 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Identify author's claims about event Evaluate evidence/reasoning author uses to support claims Evaluate author's word choice; understand that language is used deliberately 	<p>I think the author chose these words because they make me feel . . .</p> <p>The author is trying to convince me . . . (by using/saying . . .)</p>
Corroboration	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> What do other pieces of evidence say? Am I finding different versions of the story? Why or why not? What pieces of evidence are most believable? 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Establish what is true by comparing documents to each other Recognize disparities between two accounts 	<p>This author agrees/ disagrees with . . .</p> <p>This document was written earlier/later than the other, so . . .</p>

Mustafa Kemal Atatürk: We noticed that this source is an excerpt from a very long speech that Atatürk gave over a period of days that took 36 hours. Our source came from a college textbook full of readings that includes an introduction that provides much of the CONTEXT for the speech, so we do not have to investigate that.

If the source had not included the CONTEXT, what might you have had to do?

defeat gave new life to the nationalist, progressive, antimonarchist movement that had been the legacy of the "Young Turks" of the early twentieth century. The leader of that movement in 1919 was Mustafa Kemal Atatürk.

Mustafa Kemal (1881-1938) was given the surname Atatürk (father of Turks) by the National Assembly of Turkey in 1934. The young Kemal chose a military career and joined the Young Turk reform movement within the army, participating in the Young Turk revolution of 1908 that revived constitutional parliamentary government. During World War I, he successfully commanded Ottoman forces at Gallipoli in 1915, along the Russian front in 1917, and in Jordan and Syria in 1918. In 1919 he returned to Istanbul, which was occupied by foreign troops and an Ottoman government beholden to British direction. Ordered to disband the Ottoman army, Kemal instead resigned, called a Grand National Assembly of Turkey, and raised a Turkish army to fight for independence. Between 1920 and 1923, Kemal fought British designs to carve up the Ottoman Empire by waging wars against Greece in the west, Armenia in the east, and England and France in Mesopotamia. Victorious in 1923, Kemal established the Turkish Republic and became its first president, thus ending the Ottoman Empire.

The first years of the new republic were tumultuous, especially for those who expected a return to Ottoman ways. Kemal set out to transform an empire of Muslim subjects into a modern, secular, and democratic republic of citizens. In addition to abolishing the sultanate, Kemal abolished the caliphate, the institution of religious authority over the Muslim world that had enjoyed its own army as well as competing political power. He made the clergy subject to the state ministry of religious affairs, banned polygamy, and added a state-wide system of civil courts to take over most responsibilities from religious courts, including marriage. He also closed Sufi orders like that of the famous Mevlana "whirling dervishes." But the modernization of education was the central plank in the Kemalist platform for a modern Turkey. Kemal enlisted public intellectual and educational reformer John Dewey to design a system of education and common curriculum for public schools through which civic culture would be taught to girls as well as boys. Even clothing was to be modernized: Western suits and hats instead of robes and fez for men; and Western dress instead of veils for women.

As early as 1924, a reaction had set in. That year a tribal sheik declared the government anti-Islamic and led a rebellion, seizing government offices in a few cities. In response, the government passed a "Law for the Maintenance of Public Order" that banned a wide variety of groups as subversive. (The law was not repealed until 1929.) In 1926 a plot to assassinate Kemal was uncovered in the city

Mevlana

6

MUSTAFA KEMAL ATATURK

A Turkish Republic for the Civilized World

Modern Turkey's life as an independent state follows an arc closer to that of Japan than India. Like Japan, and unlike India, Turkey was never colonized. But like Japan, its independence was seriously threatened by European colonial powers at a critical moment—in this case the moment of its birth from the ashes of the Ottoman Empire in 1919. Since the fourteenth century, the formative Ottoman Empire had been the center of the Islamic faith and the power of the eastern Mediterranean. But by the beginning of the twentieth century, the Ottoman Empire was in rapid decline, beset by nationalist movements in the Balkans and the ambitions of European powers, including Russia, France, and England. The World War I alliance with Germany and the Austro-Hungarian Empire offered only a temporary delay of its inevitable collapse. But the Ottoman

Source: Ghazi Mustafa Kemal, *A Speech Delivered by Ghazi Mustafa Kemal, President of the Turkish Republic, October 1927* (Leipzig: K. F. Koehler, Publishers, 1929), 9, 16-18, 684-85, 721-23.

of Izmir. An investigation led to the conviction and execution of some of the plotters.

The speech that is excerpted in this selection was a response to the rebellion against the government. Kemal delivered the speech to the National Assembly during a period of over thirty-six hours from October 15 to October 20, 1927. He recounted events from 1919 until 1927 in chronological order and encyclopedic detail. Then he explained his goals for the continued development of the Turkish Republic. This selection contains excerpts from the beginning and end of that speech. From the evidence of this selection, what were his goals? What sort of country was he trying to create? In what ways did he want Turkey to be independent? In what ways did he want Turkey to follow the Western model of modernity? Compare Kemal with Gandhi.

THINKING HISTORICALLY

Make a note of the occasions in this speech where Kemal seeks to resolve a contradiction between two ideals or types of behavior. How does he resolve these? Notice how Kemal was both a Turkish nationalist and an admirer of Western civilization. How does he see the relationship between these two ideals? How does he envision the relationship between Turkey and the West?

I

Gentlemen,
I landed at Samsoun on the 19th May, 1919. This was the position at that time:

The group of Powers which included the Ottoman Government had been defeated in the Great War. The Ottoman Army had been crushed on every front. An armistice had been signed under severe conditions. The prolongation of the Great War had left the people exhausted and empoverished. Those who had driven the people and the country into the general conflict had fled and now cared for nothing but their own safety. Wahiddin, the degenerate occupant of the throne and the Caliphate, was seeking for some despicable way to save his person and his throne, the only objects of his anxiety. The Cabinet, of which Damad Ferid Pasha was the head, was weak and lacked dignity and courage. It was subservient to the will of the Sultan alone and agreed to every proposal that could protect its members and their sovereign.

The Army had been deprived of their arms and ammunition, and this state of affairs continued.

The Entente Powers did not consider it necessary to respect the terms of the armistice. On various pretexts, their men-of-war and troops

remained at Constantinople. The Vilayet of Adana was occupied by the French; Urfaah, Marash, Aintab, by the English. In Adalia and Konia were the Italians, whilst at Merifun and Samsoun were English troops. Foreign officers and officials and their special agents were very active in all directions. At last, on the 15th May, that is to say, four days before the following account of events begins, the Greek Army, with the consent of the Entente Powers, had landed at Smyrna. Christian elements were also at work all over the country, either openly or in secret, trying to realise their own particular ambitions and thereby hasten the breakdown of the Empire. . . .

I must mention another point here. In seeking how to save the situation it was considered to be specially important to avoid irritating the Great Powers—England, France and Italy. The idea that it was impossible to fight even one of these Powers had taken root in the mind of nearly everybody. Consequently, to think of doing so and thus bring on another war after the Ottoman Empire, all-powerful Germany and Austria-Hungary together had been defeated and crushed would have been looked upon as sheer madness.

Not only the mass of the people thought in this strain, but those also who must be regarded as their chosen leaders shared the same opinion. Therefore, in seeking a way out of the difficulty, two questions had to be eliminated from discussion. First of all, no hostility was to be shown towards the Entente Powers; secondly, the most important thing of all was to remain, heart and soul, loyal to the Padishah-Caliph.

Now, Gentlemen, I will ask you what decision I ought to have arrived at in such circumstances to save the Empire?

As I have already explained, there were three propositions that had been put forward:

1. To demand protection from England;
 2. To accept the United States of America as a mandatory Power.
- The originators of these two proposals had as their aim the preservation of the Ottoman Empire in its complete integrity and preferred to place it as a whole under the protection of a single Power, rather than allow it to be divided among several States.
3. The third proposal was to deliver the country by allowing each district to act in its own way and according to its own capability. Thus, for instance, certain districts, in opposition to the theory of separation, would have to see that they remained an integral part of the Empire. Others holding a different opinion already appeared to regard the dismemberment of the Empire as an accomplished fact and sought only their own safety.

You will remember that I have already referred to these three points. None of these three proposals could be accepted as the correct one, because the arguments and considerations on which they were based

were groundless. In reality, the foundations of the Ottoman Empire were themselves shattered at that time. Its existence was threatened with extermination. All the Ottoman districts were practically dismembered. Only one important part of the country, affording protection to a mere handful of Turks, still remained, and it was now suggested also to divide this.

Such expressions as: the Ottoman Empire, Independence, Padishah-Caliph, Government—all of them were mere meaningless words.

Therefore, whose existence was it essential to save? and with whose help? and how? But how could these questions be solved at such a time as this?

In these circumstances, one resolution alone was possible, namely, to create a New Turkish State, the sovereignty and independence of which would be unreservedly recognised by the whole world.

This was the resolution we adopted before we left Constantinople and which we began to put into execution immediately after we set foot on Anatolian soil at Samsoun.

These were the most logical and most powerful arguments in support of this resolution:

The main point was that the Turkish nation should be free to lead a worthy and glorious existence. Such a condition could only be attained by complete independence. Vital as considerations of wealth and prosperity might be to a nation, if it is deprived of its independence it no longer deserves to be regarded otherwise than as a slave in the eyes of civilised humanity.

To accept the protectorate of a foreign Power would signify that we acknowledge that we lack all human qualities; it would mean that we admit our own weakness and incapacity. Indeed, how could we make people understand that we can accept a foreign master if we have not descended to this degree of abject servitude?

But the Turk is both dignified and proud; he is also capable and talented. Such a nation would prefer to perish rather than subject itself to the life of a slave. Therefore, Independence or Death!

This was the rallying cry of all those who honestly desired to save their country.

Let us suppose for a moment that in trying to accomplish this we had failed. What would have been the result?—why, slavery!

In that case, would not the consequence have been the same if we had submitted to the other proposal? Undoubtedly, it would; but with this difference, that a nation that defies death in its struggle for independence derives comfort from the thought that it had resolved to make every sacrifice compatible with human dignity. There is no doubt whatever that in the eyes of both friend and foe throughout the world its position is more respected than would be that of a craven and degraded nation capable of surrendering itself to the yoke of slavery.

Moreover, to labour for the maintenance of the Ottoman dynasty and its sovereign would have been to inflict the greatest injustice upon the Turkish nation; for, if its independence could have been secured at the price of every possible sacrifice, it could not have been regarded as secure so long as the Sultanate existed. How could it be admitted that a crowd of madmen, united by neither a moral nor a spiritual bond to the country or the nation as a whole, could still be trusted to protect the independence and the dignity of the nation and the State?

As for the Caliphate, it could only have been a laughing-stock in the eyes of the really civilised and cultured people of the world.

As you see, in order to carry out our resolution, questions had to be dealt with about which the nation had hitherto known practically nothing. It was imperative that questions should be brought forward that could not be discussed in public without giving rise to serious dissensions.

We were compelled to rebel against the Ottoman Government, against the Padishah, against the Caliph of all the Mohamedans, and we had to bring the whole nation and the army into a state of rebellion. . . .

[1924]

. . . In the speech which I delivered on the 1st March, the fifth anniversary of the opening of the Assembly, I especially emphasised the three following points:

1. The nation demands that now, in the future, for ever and unconditionally the Republic shall be protected from every attack. The wish of the nation can be expressed through the fact that the Republic will be founded a moment earlier and completely on the whole of the positive principles which have been put to the test.

2. We declare that it is necessary without loss of time to apply the principle of unity of instruction and education which has been decided by the vote of the nation.

3. We also recognise that it is indispensable in order to secure the revival of the Islamic Faith, to disengage it from the condition of being a political instrument, which it has been for centuries through habit. . . .

. . . The discussion lasted for nearly five hours. When the discussion closed at 6.45 p.m. the Grand National Assembly had promulgated the Laws No. 429, 430 and 431.

In virtue of these laws the "Grand National Assembly of Turkey and the Government formed by it is authorised to give legal form to the stipulations which are in force in the Turkish Republic with reference to public affairs and to carry through their application." "The Ministry for Religious Affairs and the Evkaf have been suppressed."

All scientific and educational institutions in Turkish territory . . . , all ecclesiastical schools, are transferred to the Ministry of Public Instruction.

The Caliph is declared deposed and the dignity abolished. All members of the deposed Ottoman dynasty are for ever forbidden to reside within the frontiers of the territory of the Turkish Republic.

Certain persons who wrongly believed that it was necessary, for religious and political reasons to maintain the Caliphate, proposed at the last moment when the decisions were to be taken, that I should assume the office of the Caliphate.

I immediately gave a negative reply to these men. . . .

[1926]

Honourable Gentlemen, when, in consequence of serious necessity we became convinced for the first time that it would be useful for the Government to take extraordinary measures, there were people who disapproved of our action.

There were persons who disseminated and sought to gain credence to the thought that we were making use of the law for Restoration of Order and the Courts of Independence as tools of dictatorship or despotism.

There is no doubt that time and events will show to those who disseminated this opinion how mistaken they were, and put them to shame.

We never used the exceptional measures, which all the same were legal, to set ourselves in any way above the law.

On the contrary, we applied them to restore peace and quietness in the country. We made use of them to insure the existence and independence of the country. We made use of them with the object of contributing to the social development of the nation.

Gentlemen, as soon as the necessity for the application of the exceptional measures to which we had turned no longer existed, we did not hesitate to renounce them. Thus, for instance, the Courts of Independence ceased their activity at the given moment, just as the law regarding the Restoration of Order was re-submitted to the Assembly for examination as soon as its legislative term had elapsed. If the Assembly considered it necessary to prolong its application for some time this certainly happened because it saw therein the higher interest of the nation and of the Republic.

Can anyone be of the opinion that this decision of the High Assembly was intended to hand over to us the means for the carrying on of a dictatorship?

Gentlemen, it was necessary to abolish the fez, which sat on our heads as a sign of ignorance, of fanaticism, of hatred to progress and civilisation, and to adopt in its place the hat, the customary headdress of the whole civilised world, thus showing, among other things, that no difference existed in the manner of thought between the Turkish nation and the whole family of civilised mankind. We did that while the law for the Restoration

of Order was still in force. If it had not been in force we should have done so all the same; but one can say with complete truth that the existence of this law made the thing much easier for us. As a matter of fact the application of the law for the Restoration of Order prevented the morale of the nation being poisoned to a great extent by reactionaries. . . .

Gentlemen, while the law regarding the Restoration of Order was in force there took place also the closing of the Tekkes,¹ of the convents, and of the mausoleums, as well as the abolition of all sects and all kinds of titles such as Sheikh, Dervish, "Junger," Tschelebi, Occultist, Magician, Mausoleum Guard, etc.

One will be able to imagine how necessary the carrying through of these measures was, in order to prove that our nation as a whole was no primitive nation, filled with superstitions and prejudices.

Could a civilised nation tolerate a mass of people who let themselves be led by the nose by a herd of Sheikhs, Dedes, Seids, Tschelebis, Babas and Emirs; who entrusted their destiny and their lives to chiromancers, magicians, dice-throwers and amulet sellers? Ought one to conserve in the Turkish State, in the Turkish Republic, elements and institutions such as those which had for centuries given the nation the appearance of being other than it really was? Would one not therewith have committed the greatest, most irreparable error to the cause of progress and reawakening?

If we made use of the law for the Restoration of Order in this manner, it was in order to avoid such a historic error; to show the nation's brow pure and luminous, as it is; to prove that our people think neither in a fanatical nor a reactionary manner.

Gentlemen, at the same time the new laws were worked out and decreed which promise the most fruitful results for the nation on the social and economic plane, and in general in all the forms of the expression of human activity . . . the Citizens' Law-book, which ensures the liberty of women and stabilises the existence of the family.

Accordingly we made use of all circumstances only from one point of view, which consisted therein: to raise the nation on to that step on which it is justified in standing in the civilised world, to stabilise the Turkish Republic more and more on steadfast foundations . . . and in addition to destroy the spirit of despotism for ever.

These detailed descriptions, which have occupied you for so many days, are, after all, merely a report of a period of time, which will henceforth belong to the past.

I shall consider myself very happy if I have succeeded in the course of this report in expressing some truths which are calculated to rivet the interest and attention of my nation and of future generations.

¹ Buildings designed for gatherings of the Sufi brotherhood. [Ed.]


Gentlemen, I have taken trouble to show, in these accounts, how a great people, whose national course was considered as ended, reconquered its independence; how it created a national and modern State founded on the latest results of science.

The result we have attained to day is the fruit of teachings which arose from centuries of suffering, and the price of streams of blood which have drenched every foot of the ground of our beloved Fatherland.

This holy treasure I lay in the hands of the youth of Turkey.

Turkish Youth! your primary duty is ever to preserve and defend the National independence, the Turkish Republic.

STUDENT HANDOUT 5



Ataturk's Speech.

¶.1

What part of the situation (domestic or international) is Ataturk describing in this paragraph?

What is the tone Ataturk uses to describe the situation in 1919?

What particular words does Ataturk use that sets this tone?

In your own words, describe the situation.

Can you use the context to ascertain who Wahideddin was?

¶.2

What part of the situation (domestic or international) is Ataturk describing in this paragraph?

How does he describe the attitude of the Entente Powers?

What particular words does Ataturk use that sets this tone?

In your own words, describe the situation.

Can you ascertain what this issue with Christians was?

¶.3-9 (up to ...Anatolian soil at Samsun)

What does Ataturk say about the general opinion of how to handle the situation?

What about the specific proposals?

Can you determine how Ataturk himself feels about these general opinions?

Why did he outline these proposals in this speech?

How did he build up to the ending of this section (p. 892 first 3 paragraphs)

STUDENT HANDOUT 5

¶.10-13 (up to...or Death!)

How does Ataturk's tone change in these paragraphs from the earlier paragraphs?

Why do you think he changes the tone here? (Remember – audience)

¶. 14 – 19

What does Ataturk say (in your own words) about the prospect of trying to revive or restore the Ottoman Dynasty?

¶. 20-25 ([1924] - end of page 893

In your own words, what are the three points that Ataturk is summarizing here? To what other speech does he refer?

¶. 26-29 (beginning of page – [1926]

What are the new institutions Ataturk and the Assembly established? Why do you think he reminds his audience of this in the speech?

Why do you think he makes a specific point about the Caliphate?

¶. 30-34 [1926 – social development of the nation]

Why do you think Ataturk addresses these specific issues? What can you infer had happened from this part of the speech?

¶. 35-37 [Gentlemen to great extent by reactionaries...]

Why do you think Ataturk spent such a long time talking about the fez? What can you infer from this?

¶. 38-42 [Gentlemen - ..despotism for ever]

What is the tone here?

What words or phrases does Ataturk use to create this tone?

¶. 43 -48 [These detailed descriptions...end]

What tone does Ataturk use to complete the speech?

General summary:

Based up evidence from this speech, what is Ataturk's vision for the future of the Turkish Republic? Does Ataturk discuss democracy? What do you think he considers most important?

What evidence do you find in this speech that might help you answer the compelling question or any of the supporting questions?

HASSAN AL-BANA

The Tyranny of Materialism over the Lands of Islam

Hasan al-Bana (1906–1949) was an Egyptian social critic who came to believe that the cure to political corruption, foreign influence, and materialistic culture could be found in a social transformation based on the original tenets of Islam. To that effect, in 1928 he launched the Society of Muslim Brothers, an organization in which members met in cells, which were called "families," to bring about social, cultural, and political change. While actively engaged in organizing prayer groups and providing aid to the poor, the Brotherhood was seen by the Egyptian monarchy and (after 1953) the republic as a dangerous threat to the state. Members recruited volunteers to fight in Palestine and, in the wake of the war against the establishment of Israel, the Brotherhood became a powerful force in Egypt. In 1948 the organization was banned. Hassan al-Bana was assassinated in 1949 after one of the Brotherhood members assassinated the prime minister. The Muslim Brotherhood has continued to be popular and influential in Egypt and other Muslim countries despite its illegal status.

What did al-Bana see as the impact of Europe in Egypt? What seems to have offended him most about European influence? How did he hope to counter this influence?

Source: "Six Tracts of Hasan al-Bana," from the *Majma'at Rasaf'il al-Imam al-Sharif Hasan al-Raizat* (1906–1949), International Islamic Federation of Student Organizations, Kuwait & Africa, for Publishing & Distribution, Accra Ghana (2006), 42–48.

THINKING HISTORICALLY

Compare al-Bana's nationalism with that of the other anticolonialists in this chapter. Some of these proponents of independence were more personally conflicted than others. Where would you place al-Bana on a continuum from those who were completely certain to those who were torn between the appeals of opposing values? In this respect, who in the chapter does al-Bana most resemble? Who is he most unlike?

VIII. The Tyranny of Materialism over the Lands of Islam

The Europeans worked assiduously to enable the tide of this materialistic life, with its corrupting traits and its murderous germs, to overwhelm all the Islamic lands toward which their hands were outstretched. An ill destiny overtook these under their domination, for they were avid to appropriate for themselves the elements of power and prosperity through science, knowledge, industry, and good organization, while barring these very nations from them. They laid their plans for this social aggression in masterly fashion, invoking the aid of their political acumen and their military predominance until they had accomplished their desire. They deluded the Muslim leaders by granting them loans and entering into financial dealings with them, making all of this easy and effortless for them, and thus they were able to obtain the right to infiltrate the economy and to flood the countries with their capital, their banks, and their companies; to take over the workings of the economic machinery as they wished; and to monopolize, to the exclusion of the inhabitants, enormous profits and immense wealth. After that, they were able to alter the basic principles of government, justice, and education, and to imbue political, juridical, and cultural systems with their own peculiar character in even the most powerful Islamic countries. They imported their half-naked women into these regions, together with their liquors, their theatres, their dance halls, their amusements, their stories, their newspapers, their novels, their whims, their silly games, and their vices. Here they countenanced crimes they did not tolerate in their own countries, and decked out this frivolous, strident world, reeking with sin and redolent with vice, to the eyes of deluded, unsophisticated Muslims of wealth and prestige, and to those of rank and authority. This being insufficient for them, they founded schools and scientific and cultural institutes in the very heart of the Islamic domain, which cast doubt and heresy in the souls of its sons and taught them how to demean themselves, disparage their religion and their fatherland, divest themselves of their traditions and beliefs, and to regard as sacred anything Western, in the belief that only that which had a European source could serve as a model to be

emulated in this life. These schools took in the sons of the upper class alone, and became a preserve restricted to them. The sons of this class consisted of the mighty and ruling group, and those who would shortly hold within their grasp the keys to all important matters that concerned these nations and peoples. Those who did not complete their finishing in these local institutes found all that would guarantee them this finishing in the continuing series of student missions.¹ This drastic, well-organized social campaign had a tremendous success, since it was rendered most attractive to the mind, and would continue to exert a strong intellectual influence on individuals over a long period of time. For this reason, it was more dangerous than the political and military campaigns by far, and some Islamic countries went overboard in their admiration for this European civilization and in their dissatisfaction with their own Islamic character, to the point that Turkey declared itself a non-Islamic state and imitated the Europeans with the utmost rigor in everything they did. Aman Allah Khan, King of Afghanistan, tried this, but the attempt swept away his throne, and in Egypt the manifestations of this mimicry increased and became so serious that one of her intellectual leaders could say openly that the only path to progress was to adopt this civilization with all it contained of good and evil, sweet and bitter, the appealing and the hateful, the praiseworthy and the reprehensible. From Egypt it began to spread rapidly and vigorously into neighboring countries, until it reached Morocco and circumscribed the very shrines in the purlieus of the Hijaz.² We may subdivide the Islamic countries, according to the degrees to which they were affected by this materialistic civilization and the domination of its materialism over them, into three groups:

1. Countries in which this influence has reached serious proportions, penetrating even the mind and the feelings, apart from outward forms and conventions. Among these countries are Turkey and Egypt, where even the slightest trace of Islamic ideology has disappeared from all social situations, and has been driven off to take up quarters inside the mosques and Sufi establishments and retreats.
2. Countries which have been influenced by this civilization in their official observances and conventions, but in which it has not triumphed over their inward sensibilities. Such are Iran and the countries of North Africa.

¹ These were the famous student missions inaugurated by Muhammad Ali Pasha in Egypt. Groups of promising Egyptian students would be sent to Europe to learn modern Western languages and sciences, so that they might be able to translate works dealing with these disciplines into Arabic and Turkish on the completion of their studies. Many also taught in the new government schools on their return to Egypt. See J. Heyworth-Dunne, *An Introduction to the History of Education in Modern Egypt*.

² Ruler of Afghanistan from 1919. His premature attempt to emulate Egypt and Turkey by instituting modernist reforms in his country led to open revolt and his forced abdication and exile.

³ The region of Mecca and Medina. [Ed.]

3. Countries which have not been influenced by this civilization, except for a particular class consisting of the well-educated and the ruling group, to the exclusion of the common people and the masses. Such are Syria, Iraq, the Hijaz, many sections of the Arabian Peninsula, and the remainder of the Islamic countries.

Nevertheless, this wave is spreading out with the speed of lightning to reach into minds, social classes, and mores that it has not yet penetrated. Enemies of Islam can deceive Muslim intellectuals and draw a thick veil over the eyes of the zealous by depicting Islam itself as being defective in various aspects of doctrine, ritual observance, and morality, besides accommodating a host of rites, superstitions, and inane formalities. What helps them to carry out this deception is the Muslims' ignorance of the true meaning of their religion, so that many of them are satisfied with this presentation, rest content with it, and accept it. For so long a time has this been true of them that it is difficult for us to make any of them understand that Islam is a perfect system of social organization which encompasses all the affairs of life. As a result, it is possible for us to say that Western civilization, with its materialistic ideology, has triumphed in this social struggle over Islamic civilization, with its sound ideology comprising both spirit and matter, in the very territories of Islam, and in a ruthless war whose battlefield has been the spirits and souls of Muslims as well as their beliefs and intellects, exactly as it has triumphed on the political and military battlefields. It is no wonder, for the phenomena of life are not fragmented: what is strong is wholly strong, and what is weak is wholly weak: "These are the days which we apportion to mankind in turn" [Q.3:140]. And even if the ideology and teachings of Islam have gone astray, it is powerful in its essential nature, abundantly fertile and vital, attractive and enchanting in its splendor and beauty, and it will remain so because it is the truth, and human existence will never achieve perfection and virtue through any other means. And because it is of God's creation and under His care: "Lo, We have sent down the Reminder, and lo, We are its Protector" [Q.15:9]; "God refuses aught but that He should perfect His light, though the unbelievers feel aversion" [Q.9:32].

Awakening: Just as political aggression had its effect in arousing nationalist feelings, so has social aggression had its effect in reviving the Islamic ideology. Voices have been raised on every hand, demanding a return to Islam, an understanding of its precepts, and an application of its rules. The day must soon come when the castles of this materialistic civilization will be laid low upon the heads of their inhabitants. Then they will feel the burning of a spiritual hunger in which their hearts and souls will go up in flames, and they will find no sustenance, no healing, no remedy, save in the teachings of this Noble Book: "O man, an admonition from your Lord has come to you, and a healing for what is in your

C. Our Special Aims: Following these two aims, we have some special aims without the realization of which our society cannot become completely Islamic. Brethren, recall that more than 60 percent of the Egyptians live at a subhuman level, that they get enough to eat only through the most arduous toil, and Egypt is threatened by murderous famines and exposed to many economic problems of which only Allah can know the outcome. Recall too that there are more than 320 foreign companies in Egypt, monopolizing all public utilities and all important facilities in every part of the country; that the wheels of commerce, industry, and all economic institutions are in the hands of profiteering foreigners; and that our wealth in land is being transferred with lightning speed from the possession of our compatriots to that of these others. Recall also that Egypt, out of the entire civilized world, is the most subject to diseases, plagues, and illnesses; that over 90 percent of the Egyptian people are threatened by physical infirmity, the loss of some sensory perception, and a variety of sicknesses and ailments; and that Egypt is still backward, with no more than one-fifth of the population possessing any education, and of these more than 100,000 have never gone farther than the elementary school level. Recall that crime has doubled in Egypt, and that it is increasing at an alarming rate to the point that the prisons are putting out more graduates than the schools; that up to the present time Egypt has been unable to outfit a single army division with its full complement of material; and that these symptoms and phenomena may be observed in any Islamic country. Among your aims are to work for the reform of education; to war against poverty, ignorance, disease, and crime; and to create an exemplary society which will deserve to be associated with the Islamic Sacred Law.

hearts, a guidance and a mercy for the believers. Say: 'In God's bounty and in His mercy: let them rejoice in that.' It is better than what the heathen" [Q.10:58-59].

IX. Our Mission is One of Reawakening and Deliverance

A. A Weighty Heritage: So, Brethren, did Allah will that we inherit this heritage weighty with consequence, that the light of your mission glow amidst this darkness, and that Allah prepare you to exalt His Word and reveal His Sacred Law and reestablish His state: "Allah will surely aid one who helps Him. Allah is Mighty, Glorious;" [Q.22:40].

B. Our General Aims: What do we want, Brethren? Do we want to hoard up wealth, which is an evanescent shadow? Or do we want abundance of fame, which is a transient accident? Or do we want dominion over the earth? — "The earth is Allah's: He gives to inherit it those whom He will of His servants" [Q.7:127] — even as we read the Speech of Allah (Blessed and Almighty is He!): "That is the Abode of the Hereafter which We assign to those who do not want exaltation in the earth, nor any corruption. The final consequence is to the pious" [Q.28:83]. May Allah witness that we do not want any of these, that our work is not toward these ends, and that our mission is not on their behalf. Rather always bear in mind that you have two fundamental goals:

1. That the Islamic fatherland be freed from all foreign domination, for this is a natural right belonging to every human being which only the unjust oppressor or the conquering exploiter will deny.
2. That a free Islamic state may arise in this free fatherland, acting according to the precepts of Islam, applying its social regulations, proclaiming its sound principles, and broadcasting its sage mission to all mankind. For as long as this state does not emerge, the Muslims in their totality are committing sin, and are responsible before Allah the lofty, the Great for their failure to establish it and for their slackness in creating it. In these bewildering circumstances, it is counter to humanity that a state should arise, extolling an ideology of injustice and proclaiming a propaganda of oppression, while there should be no one among all mankind working for the advent of a state founded on truth, justice, and peace. We want to realize these two goals in the Nile Valley and the Arab domain, and in every land which Allah has made fortunate through the Islamic creed: a religion, a nationality, and a creed uniting all Muslims.

STUDENT HANDOUT 5

Hasan Al-Bana: Again, the author of the textbook, Kevin Reilly, has provided us with context for this piece of writing, which is excerpted from a longer work. Compare al-Bana's response to Western Imperialism to that of Ataturk.

- Read from "The European" to enormous profits and immense wealth"

To what does al-Bana ascribe Europe's influence over Muslim countries? What is his tone? What words does he use to convey his message? What events can you infer from his statements?

- Read from After that,...to .. those of rank and authority.

To whom do you think al-Bana is referring here? What do you think upsets him the most? (hint: look at the title of this tract)

- Read from "This being insufficient... to student missions" be sure to look at the footnote.

What is al-Bana doing here? Remember his audience. To whom do you think he is speaking?

- Read from This drastic,... to ..Three groups.

What is he describing? What is the tone he uses? What are some of the words that he uses to convey his message? How do you think his readers responded?

- Read the three groups (1,2, and 3)

Summarize how he divides them. What criterion/criteria is he using to differentiate the types of Muslim countries? How might Ataturk have divided and described these groupings?

- From "Nevertheless – Q.9:32. (Quran Sura 9 verse 32)

Where in this long paragraph does the tone change? How does al-Bana build up to this?

What is the effect of using quotations from the Qur'an at the end of the paragraph on the reader?

- Read from Awakening – Q 10:58-59]

How is the tone of this paragraph different from the tone of the early paragraphs?

How does it pick up on the tone change in the preceding paragraph?

Why might this have been an effective device to cause a reaction in al-Bana's readers?

What do you think al-Bana wanted as a reaction?

- Read IX Our Mission to the end.

What tone does al-Bana start this paragraph with? Does the tone change after the words "Rather, always..."

STUDENT HANDOUT 5

How does paragraph C differ in tone and approach from paragraphs A and B?

Based up evidence from this article, what is al-Bana's vision for the future of Egypt, and for that matter, the Muslim world? Why do you think his vision and his followers threatened the monarchy and the (later) Republic in Egypt?

What evidence do you find in this document that might help you answer the compelling question or any of the supporting questions?

Compare al-Bana's vision with Ataturk's in terms of the chart we created.

	Secular	Islamist
democratic		
authoritarian		

Write a one paragraph synthesis of the two readings in which you summarize and compare the perspectives of each.

STUDENT HANDOUT 6

PART SIX: RESEARCH. Start to make notes from the sources thus far – the newspaper articles and editorials, and the primary sources, to help you answer the compelling questions and supporting questions. Be sure to use proper MLA formatting to cite your sources.

What else might you need to know? So far, what have we read? Where do we go for deeper information? How do we select sources to inform our investigation? How do we determine their usefulness?

We will read and learn to skim academic, scholarly sources for useful information. Here are some articles from academic journals. Let's look at the sources to determine their reliability and usefulness.

We will read/ skim Fareed Zakaria together first. Then you will use the skills for research to review the rest of the articles and take notes for your research.

Scholarly Articles

Mabokela, Reitumetse Obakeng and Fatma Nerva Seggie. "Mini Skirts and Headscarves: Undergraduate Student Perceptions of Secularism in Turkish ." *Higher Education* (2013): 155-170.

Somer, Murat. "Moderate Islam and Secularist Oposition in Turkey: Implications for the World, Muslims and Secular Democracy." *Third World Quarterly* (2013): 1271-1289. Print.

Tezcür, Gunes Murat. "Constitutionalism, Judiciary, and Democracy in Islamic Societies." *Polity*, Vol. 39, No.4 (2007): 1-6.

Volpi, Frederic. "Pseudo-democracy in the Muslim world." *Third World Quarterly* Vol. 25.

Zakaria, Fareed. "Islam, Democracy, and Constitutional Liberalism." *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 119, No.1 (Spring 2004): No. 6 (2004): pp. 1061-1078

Islam, Democracy, and Constitutional Liberalism

FAREED ZAKARIA

It is always the same splendid setting, and the same sad story. A senior U.S. diplomat enters one of the grand presidential palaces in Heliopolis, the neighborhood of Cairo from which President Hosni Mubarak rules over Egypt. He walks through halls of marble, through rooms filled with gilded furniture—all a bad imitation of imperial French style that has been jokingly called “Louis Farouk” (after the last king of Egypt). Passing layers of security guards, he arrives at a formal drawing room where he is received with great courtesy by the Egyptian president. The two talk amiably about U.S.-Egyptian relations, regional affairs, and the state of the peace process between Israel and the Palestinians. Then the American gently raises the issue of human rights and suggests that Egypt’s government might ease up on political dissent, allow more press freedoms, and stop jailing intellectuals. Mubarak tenses up and snaps, “If I were to do what you ask, Islamic fundamentalists will take over Egypt. Is that what you want?” The conversation moves back to the latest twist in the peace process.

Over the years, Americans and Arabs have had many such exchanges. When President Clinton urged Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat to agree to the Camp David peace plan that had been negotiated in July 2001, Arafat reportedly responded with words to this effect: “If I do what you want, Hamas will be in power tomorrow.” The Saudi monarchy’s most articulate spokesman, Prince Bandar bin Sultan, often reminds American officials that if they press his government too hard, the likely alternative to the regime is not Jeffersonian democracy but a Taliban-style theocracy.

FAREED ZAKARIA has published articles on democracy and Islam in scholarly journals. Dr. Zakaria is now Editor of *Newsweek International* and a columnist for *Newsweek*. His most recent book, *The Future of Freedom: Illiberal Democracy at Home and Abroad*, is being translated into fifteen languages.

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The worst part of it is, they may be right. The Arab rulers of the Middle East are autocratic, corrupt, and heavy-handed. But they are still more liberal, tolerant, and pluralistic than those who would likely replace them. Elections in many Arab countries would produce politicians who espouse views that are closer to those of Osama bin Laden than those of Jordan's liberal monarch, King Abdullah. Last year, the emir of Kuwait, with American encouragement, proposed giving women the vote. But the democratically elected Kuwaiti parliament—filled with Islamic fundamentalists—roundly rejected the initiative. Saudi crown prince Abdullah tried something much less dramatic when he proposed that women in Saudi Arabia be allowed to drive. (They are currently forbidden to do so, which means that Saudi Arabia has had to import half a million chauffeurs from places like India and the Philippines.) But the religious conservatives mobilized popular opposition and forced him to back down.

A similar dynamic is evident elsewhere in the Arab world. In Oman, Qatar, Bahrain, Jordan, and Morocco, on virtually every political issue, the monarchs are more liberal than the societies over which they reign. Even in the Palestinian territories, where secular nationalists like Arafat and his Palestine Liberation Organization have long been the most popular political force, militant and religious groups such as Hamas and Islamic Jihad are gaining strength, especially among the young. And although they speak the language of elections, many of the Islamic parties have been withering in their contempt for democracy, which they see as a Western form of government. They would happily come to power through an election, but then would set up their own theocratic rule. It would be one man, one vote, one time.

Compare, for example, the wildly opposite reactions of state and society to the November 2001 videotape of a gloating bin Laden found by U.S. armed forces in an al-Qaeda hideout in Kabul. On tape, bin Laden shows an intimate knowledge of the September 11 attacks and delights in the loss of life they caused. Most of the region's governments quickly noted that the tape seemed genuine and proved bin Laden's guilt. Prince Bandar issued a statement: "The tape displays the cruel and inhumane face of a murderous criminal who has no respect for the sanctity of human life or the principles of his faith." Abdul Latif Arabiat, head of Jordan's Islamic party, the Islamic Action Front, asked, "Do Americans really think the world is that stupid that they would believe that this tape is evidence?"

What is going on here? *Are Islam and Democracy Compatible?*

Developing claims, using evidence and communicating your conclusions.

Assignment: Write a 500-1250 word essay addressing the compelling question “*Are Islam and Democracy Compatible*” in which you weigh the evidence (news reports, scholarly evaluations and primary sources) and use this evidence to develop a claim and a conclusion. Your essay must be written using proper historical and academic vocabulary, use proper MLA in-text citations and a full works cited page correctly formatted according the MLA protocol and draw primarily upon the evidence found in the news reports, primary sources and scholarly articles we have read. Your writing must be grammatically and stylistically correct, display evidence of complex and sophisticated structure to develop your argument, include correct spelling, punctuation and mechanics, and avoid colloquial language.

Time: This should take two class periods during which you will construct the structure and outline your argument, gather relevant information from your sources, and consult with me (your teacher) ☺ . In addition, you will spend 45-90 minutes at home drafting and revising your essay and one more class period writing the final version. You MAY be required to spend an additional 30-60 minutes outside of class making final revisions and corrections to the final draft.

In your work, you will address the following requirements:

- *Explain how supporting questions contribute to an inquiry and through engaging source work, new compelling and supporting questions emerge.*
- *Determine the kinds of sources that will be helpful in answering compelling and supporting questions taking into consideration the multiple points of view represented in an argument, the structure of an explanation, the types of sources available, and the potential uses of the sources.*
- *Gather relevant information from multiple sources representing a wide range of views while using the origin, authority, structure, context, and corroborative value of the sources to guide the selection.*
- *Evaluate the credibility of a source by examining how experts value the sources*
- *Identify evidence that draws information directly and substantively from multiple sources to detect inconsistencies in evidence in order to revise or strengthen claims.*
- *Refine claims and counterclaims attending to precision, significance, knowledge conveyed through the claim while pointing out the strengths and limitations of both*
- *Construct arguments using precise and knowledgeable claims, with evidence from multiple sources, while acknowledging counterclaims and evidentiary weaknesses.*
- *Construct explanations using sound reasoning, correct sequence (linear or non-linear), examples, and details with significant and pertinent information and data, while acknowledging the strengths and weaknesses of the explanation given its purpose (e.g., cause and effect, chronological, procedural, technical).*
- *Present adaptations of arguments and explanations that feature evocative ideas and perspectives on issues and topics to reach a range of audiences and venues outside the classroom using print and oral technologies.*
- *Critique the use of claims and evidence in arguments for credibility.*
- *Critique the use of the reasoning, sequencing and supporting evidence*

STUDENT HANDOUT 8

SAMPLE INTRODUCTORY PARAGRAPH

The Arab Spring which began in December of 2010, brought much hope that the Arab World would see a flowering of constitutional democracy following a series of non-violent and violent demonstrations across North Africa and the Middle East. These hopes were dashed during the spring and summer of 2013 as Turkey saw anti-government demonstrations violently suppressed, Egypt experienced the overthrow of a democratically elected Prime Minister followed by a military coup d'état and daily violence and the long-simmering civil war in Syria erupted into new convulsions of violence. The verdict, to the casual observer, might be that the future for any form of representative governments in these areas is grim. But before one jumps to such a bleak conclusion, one must investigate just what, exactly, is going on here. Who are the major players? What do they represent? Do they all want the same thing? What is the essential conflict?

Assessment: Your FINAL version will be assessed in criteria A,B C and D as follows

Criterion A: Knowledge and Understanding

	Generic Level descriptor	Assignment specific descriptor
0	<i>The student does not reach a standard described by any of the descriptors given below.</i>	
1-2	<i>The student makes a limited attempt to use some relevant terminology and demonstrates basic knowledge and understanding of content and concepts with simple descriptions and/or examples..</i>	The student makes a limited attempt to use some tier three vocabulary (names of parties, references to political inclinations such as moderate, extremist, and historical references etc.) and some tier two vocabulary to demonstrate a basic understanding of the issues regarding the implementation and sustainability of democracy in Turkey, Egypt and/or Syria. The student's essay includes some references to different perspectives on democracy in Islamic areas and includes simple descriptions or explanations and examples.
3-4	<i>The student uses terminology that is accurate and/or appropriate and demonstrates knowledge and understanding of content and concepts through adequate descriptions, explanations or examples.</i>	The student uses some correct tier three vocabulary (names of parties, references to political inclinations such as moderate, extremist, and historical references etc.) as well as tier two vocabulary to demonstrate an understanding of the issues regarding the implementation and sustainability of democracy in Turkey, Egypt and Syria. The student's essay includes an assessment of some perspectives on democracy in Islamic areas and includes adequate descriptions of some perspectives as well referenced examples of work from some sources. The student constructs the arguments using some explanations or examples.
5-6	<i>The student uses a range of terminology accurately and appropriately and demonstrates good knowledge and understanding of content and concepts through accurate descriptions, explanations and examples</i>	The student uses a range of correct tier three vocabulary (names of parties, references to political inclinations such as moderate, extremist, and historical references etc.) as well as tier two vocabulary to demonstrate a good understanding of the complexities of the issues regarding the implementation and sustainability of democracy in Turkey, Egypt and Syria as well as other Muslim states. The student's essay includes an assessment of the various perspectives on democracy in Islamic areas and includes accurate descriptions of the various perspectives as well as correctly cited examples of work from the various sources. The student constructs the arguments using knowledgeable claims, with evidence from multiple sources, while acknowledging some counterclaims and evidentiary weaknesses.
7-8	<i>The student uses a wide range of terminology accurately and appropriately and demonstrates detailed knowledge and understanding of content and concepts through developed and accurate descriptions, explanations and examples.</i>	The student uses a wide range of correct tier three vocabulary (names of parties, references to political inclinations such as moderate, extremist, and historical references etc.) as well as tier two vocabulary to demonstrate a detailed and deep understanding of the complexities of the issues regarding the implementation and sustainability of democracy in Turkey, Egypt and Syria as well as other Muslim states. The student's essay includes a well-developed assessment of the various perspectives on democracy in Islamic areas and includes accurate descriptions of the various perspectives as well as correctly cited examples of work from the various sources. The student constructs the arguments using precise and knowledgeable claims, with evidence from multiple sources, while acknowledging counterclaims and evidentiary weaknesses.

Criterion B: Investigating

	Generic Level descriptor	Assignment specific descriptor
0	The student does not reach a standard described by any of the descriptors given below.	
1-2	The student formulates a very general research question; formulates and follows a limited action plan to investigate a research question; collects and records limited information not always consistent with the research question; makes a limited attempt to address the research question.	The student formulates a few very general supporting questions to guide an investigation of the question <i>“Are Islam and Democracy Compatible”</i> and follows a limited plan to investigate this question. The student collects some limited information relevant to the research question. The student makes a limited attempt to answer the research question.
3-4	The student formulates an adequate research question[formulates and follows a partial action plan to investigate a research question[uses a method or methods to collect and record some information consistent with the research question; partially addresses the research question.	The student formulates some adequate supporting questions to guide an investigation of the question <i>“Are Islam and Democracy Compatible”</i> and develops a partial plan to investigate this question. The student partially determines the kinds of sources that will be helpful in answering compelling and supporting questions taking into the types of sources available. The student uses a method to collect some information relevant to the research question. The student partially addresses the research question.
5-6	The student formulates a clear research question; formulates and follows a satisfactory action plan to investigate a research question; uses methods to collect and record appropriate information consistent with the research question; satisfactorily addresses the research question.	The student formulates supporting questions to guide an investigation of the question <i>“Are Islam and Democracy Compatible”</i> and develops a plan to investigate this question. The student determines the kinds of sources that will be helpful in answering compelling and supporting questions taking into consideration some of the multiple points of view represented in an argument, the structure of an explanation, the types of sources available, and the potential uses of the sources. The student appropriately collects information from the sources provided as well as from additional, authoritative sources. The student satisfactorily addresses the research question.
7-8	The student formulates a clear and focused research question; formulates and follows a detailed action plan to investigate a research question; uses methods accurately to collect and record appropriate and varied information consistent with the research question; effectively addresses the research question.	The student formulates clear supporting questions to guide an investigation of the question <i>“Are Islam and Democracy Compatible”</i> and develops a detailed plan to investigate this question. The student determines the kinds of sources that will be helpful in answering compelling and supporting questions taking into consideration the multiple points of view represented in an argument, the structure of an explanation, the types of sources available, and the potential uses of the sources. The student accurately and appropriately collects information from the sources provided as well as from additional, authoritative sources. The student effectively addresses the research question.

Criterion C: Thinking Critically

	Generic level descriptor	Assignment specific descriptor
0	The student does not reach a standard described by any of the descriptors given below.	
1-2	The student makes a limited attempt to analyse concepts, events, issues, models or arguments; describes some sources in terms of origin and purpose and recognizes some values and limitations; identifies different perspectives; makes connections between information in a limited attempt to make arguments.	The student's written essay makes a limited attempt to analyze concepts related to the compelling question " <i>Is Islam Compatible with Democracy,</i> " describes some sources and identifies some perspectives in sources. The student's essay makes connections among information and events and makes a limited attempt to create an argument.
3-4	The student completes a simple analysis of concepts, events, issues, models or arguments; completes a simple analysis and/or evaluation of some sources in terms of origin and purpose, recognizing values and limitations; identifies different perspectives and their implications; makes connections between information to make simple arguments.	The student's written essay includes a simple analysis of the claims and concepts related to the compelling question " <i>Is Islam Compatible with Democracy,</i> " a simple analysis of the various events that support the claim being made in the essay, identifies some different perspectives in sources on the topic and their implications. The student's essay makes connections among information and events to make a simple argument.
5-6	The student completes a satisfactory analysis of concepts, events, issues, models or arguments; satisfactorily analyses and/or evaluates a range of sources in terms of origin and purpose, recognizing values and limitations; interprets different perspectives and their implications; synthesizes information to make valid arguments.	The student's written essay includes satisfactory analysis of the claims and counter claims related to the compelling question " <i>Is Islam Compatible with Democracy,</i> " a detailed analysis of the various events that either support or counter the claim being made in the essay, evaluates a range of sources on the topic, while acknowledging strengths and weaknesses, the values, and perspectives present in the sources. The student's essay interprets the various perspectives on the topic to make a valid, well supported argument.
7-8	The student completes a detailed analysis of concepts, events, issues, models or arguments; effectively analyses and evaluates a range of sources in terms of origin and purpose, recognizing values and limitations; thoroughly interprets a range of different perspectives and their implications; synthesizes information to make valid, well-supported arguments.	The student's written essay includes detailed, specific and thorough analysis of the claims and counter claims related to the compelling question, " <i>Is Islam Compatible with Democracy,</i> " a detailed analysis of the various events that either support or counter the claim being made in the essay, evaluates a range of sources on the topic, while acknowledging strengths and weaknesses, the values, and perspectives present in the sources. The student's essay interprets the various perspectives on the topic to make a valid, well supported argument.

STUDENT HANDOUT 8

Criterion D: Communicating

	Generic level descriptor	Assignment specific descriptor
0	The student does not reach a standard described by any of the descriptors given below.	
1-2	The student communicates information and ideas by attempting in a limited way to use a style that is appropriate to the audience and purpose; makes a limited attempt to structure information and ideas in a way that is appropriate to the specified format ; makes a limited attempt to document sources of information.	The student writes an essay that addresses some information on Islam and Democracy. The student constructs an argument with evidence from at least three sources. The student makes a limited attempt to develop explanations using a sequence and structure. The student makes a limited attempt to develop an argument appropriate to the format of an academic essay. The student makes a limited attempt to documents source of information using some in-text references and a works cited page, although it may be incorrectly formatted.
3-4	The student communicates information and ideas by using a style that is sometimes appropriate to the audience and purpose; structures information and ideas in a way that is sometimes appropriate to the specified format; sometimes documents sources of information using a recognized convention.	The student writes an essay that reviews some claims and counterclaims regarding Islam and Democracy. The student constructs an argument with evidence from several sources. The student constructs some explanations using a sequence and structure. The student sometimes develops an argument appropriate to the format of an academic essay. The student mostly documents sources of information using properly formatted in-text references and a works cited page.
5-6	The student communicates information and ideas by using a style that is often appropriate to the audience and purpose; structures information and ideas in a way that is often appropriate to the specified format; often documents sources of information using a recognized convention.	The student writes an essay that refines some claims and counterclaims regarding Islam and Democracy, attending to knowledge conveyed through the claim while acknowledging the counterclaim. The student constructs an argument using knowledgeable claims, with evidence from multiple sources. The student constructs explanations using appropriate sequence and structure, examples, and details with pertinent information. The student presents adaptations of some arguments, explanations and perspectives on issues and topics to reach a range of audiences and venues outside the classroom. The student almost completely documents sources of information using properly formatted in-text references and a mostly completely correct works cited page.
7-8	The student communicates information and ideas effectively by using a style that is consistently appropriate to the audience and purpose; structures information and ideas in a way that is consistently appropriate to the specified format; consistently documents sources of information using a recognized convention.	The student writes an effective essay that refines claims and counterclaims regarding Islam and Democracy, attending to precision, significance, knowledge conveyed through the claim while pointing out the strengths and limitations of both. The student constructs an argument using precise and knowledgeable claims, with evidence from multiple sources, while acknowledging counterclaims and evidentiary weaknesses. The student constructs explanations using sound reasoning, correct sequence and structure, examples, and details with significant and pertinent information and data, while acknowledging the strengths and weaknesses of the explanation given its purpose. The student presents adaptations of arguments and explanations that feature evocative ideas and perspectives on issues and topics to reach a range of audiences and venues outside the classroom .The student consistently documents sources of information using properly formatted in-text references and a completely correct works cited page.

Islam and Democracy
Student One

The recent military coup d'état in Egypt, resulting in the ousting of the first elected president in the country Mohammed Morsi, has left the prospect of a successful democracy in the country severely shaken. Similar situations with governments have occurred in Syria, where an outright civil war has emerged, and in Turkey with violent anti-government protests and demonstrations occurring daily. Egypt, Turkey and Syria aren't outliers in regard to their struggle with achieving democracy, specifically in that area of the world. The Middle East has been a hot spot for political turmoil and violence since the Iranian Revolution of 1979. In fact, while around the world, 75% of the countries are currently free, only "28% of the Middle Eastern countries could be so described" (Zakaria, p.3). While the lay person of today has predominantly believed that Islam and democracy are incompatible because of recent failures with Islamic nations who have attempted to implement democracy, one must look at what each institution itself supports. To a certain extent, Islam and democracy are compatible because they share some similar beliefs. However one must consider other factors regarding the state and cultural region when evaluating the potential for a successful union of the two.

Islam, to believers, is considered a template to be followed in all aspects of life, including in politics. The Qur'an offers a model of leadership that sometimes considered highly authoritarian. It's "bursting with examples of the just king ... something that we wouldn't associate with democracy in the least. But that view is not all Islam offers when it comes to leadership. In the *hadith* (the actions and sayings of the Prophet Muhammad) the religion provides an, "anti-authoritarian streak that is evident in every Muslim land today", The *hadith* states that, "obedience to the ruler is incumbent on the Muslims only so far as the ruler's commands are in keeping with God's Laws" (Zakaria, p.4). This, provides Muslims with the means to release themselves from an authoritarian ruler that doesn't support and follow the Islamic rules of law (*Sharia*). Therefore, the leadership aspect of Islam supports both authoritarian and anti-authoritarian forms of rulership, agreeing and disagreeing with democracy. Adding to the confusion is the fact that the political values of Islam are difficult to sort out because there is no religious authority. This makes it possible for *fatwas* (religious orders) to come from and be condemned by any source, whether it be a radical like Bin-Laden or a regular Joe in New York. Without an authority figure to turn to, Muslims are left up to their own devices to choose to whom they want to be obedient, causing conflict. Khomeini, establisher of the Islamic Republic of Iran in 1979, believed that, "the Islamic regime has the right to sacrifice Islamic principles in order to ensure the security and survival of the state." (Tezcur, p.484). He took a radically different stance from the beliefs of the Prophet Muhammad, who believed followers need no longer support a state if it stops keeping with God's laws. Both individuals are undeniably Islamic and yet have two drastically different beliefs displaying that political values within Islam aren't quite clear, to say the least

Throughout the world we've seen attempts to implement democracies in predominantly Muslims countries. Some have been huge disasters, giving us situations like the one currently in Egypt. But not all countries have proved to have similar fates. Indonesia for example has been a democratic success for the whole world to look up to. "Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton has declared, 'If you want to know whether Islam, democracy, modernity and women's rights can coexist, go to Indonesia.'" (Harsono, NYT).

SAMPLE STUDENT WORK

Indonesia has moved forward with constitutionalism, and has, “experienced three rounds of democratic and transparent general elections (1999, 2004, and 2009), the development of a vibrant press, and the rise of civil society movements. (Anwar, Freedom House)”. Developments that lead to a stronger civil society, a liberal constitution and rule of law in turn make the state increasingly democratic. Indonesia, having made strides when it comes to these developments, has proved that it is working toward ensuring democracy. Indonesia is not the only country proving Islam and democracy compatible; Turkey demonstrates that democracy is achievable for Muslim states as well. Over the years there have been “deeply rooted changes wherein standards of democracy have improved.” (Kucukan p.1). Civil society along with civil rights has been developed and there has been a steady emergence of libertarian views along with progressive policies within Turkey leading to an increasingly democratic state. Both countries have had their democracies undermined by outside sources accusing their leaders of being “authoritarian.” But to condemn them as undemocratic would mean completely ignoring advances they have made toward becoming fully democratic states. More advances have been made in order toward democracy than away.

If scholars have concluded that Islam is no doubt harmonious to the institute of democracy, but then what seems to be the problem? Why have so many Muslim countries not been able to achieve democracy if so many Islamic principles and canons “actually support democratic and liberal norms” (Tezcur p. 497). Different scholars have varying opinions. Fareed Zakaria hypothesizes that the problem lies in the culture and easy money available in some Arab states without them having to modernize their economies. The Arab culture and social structure are also “deeply authoritarian,” and it is apparent in an overwhelming amount of Arab daily life, including politics. This solidifies Fareed Zakaria’s belief that culture plays a role in the failure of implementation in democracy as democracy and authoritarianism are polar opposites. Although culture may play some type of role in this situation, the Middle East historically hasn’t been the only region with authoritarian social structures. If other states with historically similar social structures have been able to establish an institution of democracy, what makes the Middle Eastern culture so rigid in its “opposition” to democracy? Hassan al- Banna, an Egyptian social critic who established the Muslim Brotherhood, firmly believed that Islam had lost its political dominance because of the corrupt ways of its leaders influenced by the West. His hypothesis was that Islamic countries need not establish democracies but return back to the original tenets of Islam. Although Al-Banna is now deceased his party, the Muslim Brotherhood “is still a powerful force in Islam today” (Reilley, p.902). Ideologies that have sprung up within the Arab area in the past undoubtedly affect the social aura of the area now shaping the views of those who live there. People like Al-Banna, who railed against democracy and had a tremendous effect over the area are among the factors influencing why Muslim countries have not been able to fully integrate democracy. The area has been spoon-fed beliefs from all different ideological bowls and this affects the social beliefs of the people today.

Suggestions scholars have made regarding the failures of democracy in Muslim countries vary significantly. Zakaria believes that the road to success in these countries will only happen through constitutional liberalism and economic and political reforms. Constitutional liberalism allows for free civil societies and open market economies. This method will allow for Arab states to modernize their economies as well as expand the rights that they offer thus, in Fareed Zakaria’s mind curing the Middle East of the problems holding them back from democracy. But if the region is having a hard time implementing basic democratic

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policies and having free and fair elections, how reasonable is it for us to assume they will be able to achieve constitutional liberalism? Even Zakaria states that it is, “more difficult to push constitutional liberalism on a society.” (Zakaria, p. 18) Somer (year?) believes that the solution is democratic consolidation, which describes a country in which democracy is established as the only form of government. This means it would become unthinkable for the countries to regress to authoritarian ways. Democratic consolidation requires major political actors to develop trust between one another and the embracing of secularism. But again, how reasonable is it for us to assume this can be accomplished in these Middle Eastern countries? Can they truly achieve a separation of state and religion when scholars such as Kupchan state “religion and politics are interwoven throughout the Middle East” (Kupchan, p ?). Aside from the trust requirement of this approach will likely never be agreed upon by political players in the Middle East. Although scholars have pinpointed the different sources of discord between democracy and the area of the Middle East, finding a solution has proved to be much harder. The success of Islam and democracy together in the Middle East region is something only time will tell.

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Are Islam and Democracy Compatible?

Student Two

The recent turmoil in the Middle East has re-opened ~~up~~ the dialog on democracy in the Middle East. Citizens in countries like Egypt and Syria have been protesting for a revolution. Out with the old authoritarian leaders and in with the new democratic ones. But, these new democratic leaders like Muhammad Morsi (newly elected Egyptian president) have proved to be not much better than the old dictators. These events have led some to say that Islam is to blame for the Middle East's inability to make the transition to democracy. However, an investigation of the evidence clearly shows that Islam is not the enemy of democracy. There have been successful democracies in mainly Islamic countries like Turkey and Indonesia (CIA). Although Syria is technically secular and does not have a democracy (there are always exceptions to the rule), it seems that secularism is the common denominator in Turkey and Indonesia. If other countries in the Middle East adopted secularism, the country would have a better time transitioning to democracy while still keeping their Islamic culture. The shift from authoritarianism may not be smooth, but eventually it will end in democracy. Turkey's journey to democracy illustrates this point. From its founding in 1923 to 2004, there were over seven coups but Turkey has made it to the democratic stage with the help of continuous and strong secularism. (Stedman)

While Islam works as a social culture, it does not work with government. For instance, Egypt, even if the Muslim Brotherhood claims it's a civil secular country, is thought of as the "Islamic seat of learning" by its people. Now, Egypt's people are protesting and have toppled the government twice (Rehman). Complete secularization has proved successful in Turkey, a state with 99% Islamic population (Mabokela and Seggie). In fact, Turkey is so secularized that headscarves or veils are not allowed in state-funded post-secondary education facilities (Mabokela and Seggie). This ideology is seen in the AKP (*Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi* or Justice and Development) party of Turkey. The AKP is a party with deep connections to Islam. Despite these connections, they have been able to separate their religious views from their political actions to create a period of economic and democratic growth (Somer). There are some who argue that Erdoğan is trying to slowly make Turkey an Islamic state. Evidence for this claim comes from numerous recent events, such as the "bikini controversy". The bikini controversy was an incident where advertisers in Istanbul were complaining that Erdoğan's administration was denying advertisements that contained pictures of women in bikinis. This is an example of how Islamic conservatism is seeping into Turkey's secular and western system. More recently, Erdoğan declared that *Aryan*, a yogurt drink, rather than the *Raki*, the anise-based traditional alcoholic Turkish drink, was the "Turkish national drink." (Stedman). These types of slightly Islamic policies have sparked anti-government protests in Turkey, further supporting the claim that complete secularism is the way for Islam and democracy to be compatible (Tanchum).

Westernization is another factor people claim contributes to democracies' failure in the Middle East. Hassan al-Bana, the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood, originally made this claim in 1928 in *Six Tracts of Hassan al-Bana*. In fact, in his Muslim Brotherhood party manifesto, he expresses his contempt for Westernization with statements like, "The Europeans work assiduously to enable the tide of this materialistic life, with its corrupting traits and its murderous germs, to overwhelm all the Islamic lands..." (al-Bana). He claims that Western society is trying to exterminate Islamic culture and values and replace them with their own "reeking with sin and redolent with vice" (al-Bana) onto their people. He also believes that Islam is a model for society *and* government. On the opposite end of the spectrum, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, a contemporary of al-Bana, believed that Westernization was a very

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positive thing. He believed that in order to have democracy in Turkey the country must Westernize. He states in his speech *A Turkish Republic for the Civilized World*, "...it was necessary to abolish the fez, which sat on our heads as a sign of ignorance, of fanaticism, of hatred to progress and civilization, and to adopt in its place the hat, the customary headdress of the whole civilized world..." (Ataturk). He argued that Islam has been holding the Turkish people back from freedom because of their old fashioned ways. To him, in order to have a western style government (democracy), they must have a western style society as well. Based on these secular and western views, Ataturk founded the Republic of Turkey, the country that is today the most successful democracy in the Muslim world (Ataturk).

Finally, the last argument questions whether Islamic religion itself is compatible with democracy. Many scholars (e.g. Ernest Gellner and Samuel Huntington) claim that "...Islam fosters an essentially illiberal political culture, either because of some of its more uncompromising, dogmatic normative premises." (Volpi). This claim is based on the misconception that the Islamic faith promotes authoritarianism because of examples of authoritarian leadership in the Koran. However, the Bible has many examples of authoritarian leaderships as well. The type of government in a religion's holy book has never stopped states whose population is mostly Christian or Jewish from forming successful democracies (Zakaria). So if other religions can do it, why can't Islamists?

The answer is simple, Islamists can; but not necessarily suddenly. While a liberal democracy is the model the West would like to see implemented, immediate transition to liberal democracy often leads to disorder and chaos within the countries' government and society (Kupchan). This is evident in many Middle Eastern countries involved in the Arab spring. One such country is Egypt. Egypt ousted their authoritarian leader of multiple decades, Hosni Mubarak, and democratically elected Muhammad Morsi of the Muslim Brotherhood. But it was not long before protesters were back in Tahir Square demanding the removal of their leader once more (Analysts: Turkey Losing Regional Clout as Egypt Crisis Flares).

As you can see, achieving democracy in the Middle East is a complicated and delicate process, but very possible. But, by adopting secularism, countries whose population is mainly Muslim can achieve democracy just like Turkey.

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What is going on here?

Student Three

A raging Civil War in Syria, violent demonstrations in Turkey, and military coup d'état in Egypt have revived the religious and political controversy regarding democracy and Islam. While some scholars have pronounced democracy incompatible with Islam; others believe democracy could possibly be implemented in the Islamic world. Western countries, especially the U.S., have pushed democracy onto Islamic countries in the hope of eliminating terrorism and violence. Some Arab rulers refuse accept the possibility of democracy for fear of the consequences. Arab rulers fear that terrorists or Islamic extremists will replace them as leadership; that elected Islamists will be less liberal than they are. Perhaps, the question may not be whether Islam and democracy are compatible but rather whether democracy and the region's people are. Are Arabians accepting of democracy? Many people assume Islam is the reason democracy seems to be unobtainable in the Middle East; however, democracy may be the problem. Is democracy actually the solution to the violence that plagues the Middle East or is there another?

The political climate in the Middle East is often described as religiously-extremist and violent; an environment in which a liberal democracy does not easily fit. The Arab world mainly consists of autocratic states and illiberal societies, (Zakaria, p.3). In this environment there is no support for a developing democratic states. According to Zakaria, receding political and economic failures, and Arabian peoples' cultural attitudes toward anything associated with Western countries are the cause of this environment. (p 4)

Hassan al-Bana, the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood, argues in his 1928 essay, "The Tyranny of materialism over the lands of Islam", that Islam should be the basis for government. He writes that Western civilizations have materialistic ideology and their influence on Islamic states has become too over-powering. Islamic countries were using them as models for the perfect governments. Fearing that the Islamic ideology and cultural identity that distinguishes the Middle East would be lost; he spread the belief that the word of Allah is the only means of achieving perfection and virtue using the Muslim Brotherhood, (al-Bana, p.899). Scholars say understanding how people in the region relate to Islam will reveal the key to the turmoil in the Middle East, (Zakaria, p. 3).

Al-Bana wrote in the late 1920's, before states became modernized and when governments did not necessarily need to be centralized. Scholars say that what needs to be realized is that Islam cannot be the only rule of law in a modern society. The Muslim Brotherhood "lacks the understanding on how to govern a large modern democratic Islamic country." In Egypt and Turkey citizens are having an identity crisis because there is not balance between Islam and democracy; rulers are either too secular or too religious, (Rehman, p.2). Secularism is not solution because Islam is deeply rooted into the politics and culture of the region; but there needs to be some boundaries between Islam and state to ensure the liberties of all citizens.

Perhaps as, Alfred Stephan posited, religion and democracy need to exist in 'twin tolerations'. They can co-exist as long as government has religion but does not interfere with people's liberties, (Somer, p.1281). Turkey, for example, could be a model for an Islamic democratic state. "Its laws and political institutions are based in strictly secular principles. But it also exemplifies high state regulation of Islam..." (Somer,

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p.1276). Turkey influences social norms and culture by offering a version of Islam that is apolitical, rationalist, and does not seek to regulate all spheres of life; which is considered moderate Islam. Moderate Islam embraces modern lifestyles and rejects revolutionary methods to make it hard to justify restricting it within a democratic system, (Somer, p. 1277). Despite current protests on-going in the country, it has a successful economy and well-functioning democracy, (Dervis, p.1). Some may consider current conflicts in Turkey is as a sign that Islam and democracy are not compatible; just as people see Turkey's efforts to bring democracy to Egypt and Syria as a failure, (Aribiya, p.1). However, some scholars say that the real problem is that leaders are trying to introduce democracy in the wrong manner and too quickly. Perhaps, the solution may not be establishment of democracy itself but the gradual introduction of democratic values and political institutions with the fusion of Islamic values. As Murat Somer wrote, secularism does not necessary consolidate democracy, (p. 1281), therefore, democracy is achievable without secularism.

Fareed Zakaria writes that constitutional liberalism is what Arab countries need rather than democracy, (p. 15). Currently Arabian leaders are above the constitution; the constitution needs to be above the leaders. A liberal constitution will establish government and non-governmental organizations that promote constitutional liberalism, rule of law, elections, and economic, civil and religious liberties. These developments are necessary before a democratic state can be consolidated because they create checks and balances and the prevention of power and the abuse of office, (Zakaria, pp. 18, 19).

There also needs to be economic and political reform. Many Middle Eastern countries are trust-fund states, where money is easily obtainable. The majority of that money remains in the upper class and the poor are in poverty; this creates a huge economic distinction between the rich and poor. An economic movement "toward capitalism will create limited, accountable state and a genuine middle class". Also, taxation will create government-citizen interaction, (Zakaria, p.16).

Charles A. Kupchan writes in, "Democracy in Egypt Can Wait", that "constitutional constraints, judicial reform, political parties, economic privatization [are] building blocks of democratic societies [that] need time to take root", (p.2). Constitutional liberalism should be the primary goal because democracy takes time to implement. The necessary developments are smaller goals that begin the process that will eventually lead to Arab countries becoming democratic. Furthermore, Arab leaders should be more accepting of this approach because it is more gradual, while before democracy was expected to happen rapidly.

Democracy and Islam are compatible within the Middle Eastern region. Arab countries need to approach democracy with constitutional liberalism and gradualism; Western countries should assist with the process but not push it too rapidly. If this happens then democracy should be achieved successfully.

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